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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This ERISA appeal arises from an order of the District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting a 
preliminary injunction to approximately 136 former 
employees of Freedom Forge Corporation (and to surviving 
spouses of former employees), who are individually named 
plaintiffs in a suit seeking to require Freedom Forge to 
continue funding the health benefits plan currently in place 
for retirees and spouses. The preliminary injunction 
requires funding pending trial. The gravamen of the 
plaintiffs' claim is that Freedom Forge induced them into 
early retirement with oral assurances that their health 
insurance benefits would continue essentially unmodified 
until death, without informing them that it actually 
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retained the power to amend or eliminate the benefits 
program altogether. In doing so, the plaintiffs contend, 
Freedom Forge breached its duties as an ERISA fiduciary 
by misrepresenting and omitting material facts. 
 
This suit was prompted by Freedom Forge's 
announcement that it would be switching from a self- 
insured benefits program with no premiums to a managed 
care system in which retirees would be able to choose 
among plans. Almost all of the choices that would provide 
health care comparable to that which they now receive 
would require the plaintiffs to pay monthly premiums. 
Shortly after filing suit, the plaintiffs moved for a 
preliminary injunction, alleging that they would be 
irreparably harmed if Freedom Forge changed the plans, 
and asserting that they were reasonably likely to succeed 
on the merits. After a hearing, the District Court granted 
the requested preliminary injunction. 
 
This appeal primarily presents the important question 
whether a district court, faced with a large group of 
plaintiffs whom the court determines are reasonably likely 
to succeed on the merits, may grant a preliminary 
injunction to the entire group of plaintiffs if there is 
evidence that some, but not all, of the plaintiffs will suffer 
irreparable harm. At the preliminary injunction hearing, 
only eleven of the approximately 136 plaintiffs testified, 
while none of the other plaintiffs presented evidence that 
they were threatened with irreparable harm or were 
similarly situated to those who testified. We conclude that 
the demanding requirements for a preliminary injunction 
do not yield to numbers. The vast majority of the plaintiffs 
did not present sufficient evidence upon which the court 
could find that they faced irreparable harm. Accordingly, we 
will vacate the preliminary injunction as to all but three of 
the plaintiffs for failure to meet the essential irreparable 
harm requirement of a preliminary injunction. 
 
Because we find that three of the plaintiffs have 
adequately established that they are threatened with 
irreparable harm, we also consider, and affirm (as to two of 
them), the District Court's determination that they were 
reasonably likely to succeed on the merits. Their claim 
appears to fall squarely within the framework established 
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by In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits"ERISA" 
Litigation, 57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995), which held that it 
is a breach of fiduciary duty for an employer to knowingly 
make material misleading statements about the stability of 
a benefits plan. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
A. The Parties and the Proposed Change in the Plan 
 
The plaintiffs are retired employees, and surviving 
spouses of employees, of the Burnham, Pennsylvania 
facility of Freedom Forge Corporation's Standard Steel 
Division. Since 1975, Freedom Forge has provided health 
benefits to retirees and their spouses through a self-insured 
plan--the Freedom Forge Corporation Welfare Benefit Plan 
for Salaried Employees and Retirees of the Standard Steel 
Division (the "Plan"). The Plan, administered by 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company until 1988, is now 
administered by a third-party administrator, Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield. It is a self-insured plan, as Freedom Forge 
pays for the cost of retiree health coverage, and pays the 
administrator to process claims. Although the Plan 
beneficiaries are responsible for paying a yearly deductible 
and copayments if necessary, they do not have to pay 
premiums. 
 
Early in 1999, Freedom Forge announced that it intended 
to switch from the Plan to a system of coverage through 
managed care programs. Under the proposal, retirees under 
age 65 would be switched to Keystone Health Plan Central 
coverage, and would be required to pay a portion of their 
premiums, ranging from $30 to $90. Those older than 65 
would be able to choose between two different plans: (1) a 
plan with no premium payments required, but a $10 co- 
payment per prescription and limited annual benefits of 
drug prescriptions ($1250); and (2) a plan with $20 to $40 
monthly premiums, $10 to $20 co-payment per 30-day 
supply of prescription drugs, and drug benefits limited to 
$2500 a year. The retirees immediately protested. 
Approximately 130 retirees and spouses thereupon joined 
in this ERISA-based suit. They allege that Freedom Forge 
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owed them a duty, as their fiduciary, not to mislead them 
about their benefits under the Plan; that Freedom Forge 
breached that duty by misleading them into thinking they 
would never have to pay premiums; and that this breach 
harmed them by inducing them to retire early and 
otherwise rely on the assurances. 
 
The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to 
require Freedom Forge to maintain the preexisting plan 
pending suit.1 At the hearing, two Freedom Forge 
administrators (Robert Robinson, Manager of Compensation 
and Benefits since 1979, and Thomas McGuigan, Vice 
President of Human Resources and Administration) 
testified, and the plaintiffs introduced deposition testimony 
of Gerald Sieber, who had been in charge of pension 
administration at the Burnham facility from 1978 to 1993. 
Eleven of the plaintiffs also testified. Plaintiffs' counsel 
explained: "We're not going to call 130 witnesses. We are 
going to, because of the time limitations, call what we 
believe is a representative sample of the plaintiffs." 
However, he adduced no evidence that the eleven witnesses 
were representative of the other retirees and surviving 
spouses. 
 
The evidence presented at the preliminary injunction 
hearing established that in 1982 and 1991, Freedom Forge 
developed "voluntary job elimination programs" ("VJEPs") to 
encourage voluntary retirement.2 The controversy centers 
around the terms and tenor of the formal and informal 




1. The plaintiffs also moved for class certification, and the court 
requested briefing on the issue. The defendants objected. As of the date 
of the appeal, no class certification determination had been made. 
 
2. There is some dispute about the motive for instituting the VJEPs. 
Freedom Forge claims that the VJEPs were attempts to help potential 
retirees because they allowed them to retire with benefits, instead of 
firing them outright, which Freedom Forge retained the right to do. The 
plaintiffs contend that Freedom Forge intended to eliminate the older 
workers and could not otherwise do so without incurring potential 
liability for age discrimination. The motive, whatever it may have been, 
does not affect our analysis of the parties' rights and duties. 
 
                                6 
 
 
B. The Representations to the Plaintiffs 
 
1. Oral Communications 
 
To introduce the VJEPS, Freedom Forge held meetings 
describing the programs and their benefits. Gerald Sieber 
testified via deposition that it was his job to meet with 
prospective retirees and brief them on the retirement 
benefits to which they were entitled. Sieber, along with 
other members of the benefits administration team, also 
met informally with potential retirees and answered their 
questions. Sieber testified that he knew that health 
insurance was very important to people considering 
retirement, that it was "always discussed" and that "I would 
get a lot of questions on it. I think it was a very major 
factor, especially if one was approaching early retirement, it 
was a major factor in determining whether they were going 
to take early retirement or not." 
 
Sieber testified that he told employees that they (and 
their surviving spouses) would be insured for their 
lifetimes. He acknowledged that he told people that the 
benefits would be free of monthly charge. Although he later 
testified that he did not use those words ("free of any 
monthly charge"), he explained: 
 
       I would normally say, your program of health 
       insurance benefits continues as it is, with the 
       exception of dental coverage . . . and the fact that the 
       retiree program contained some different allowances for 
       certain parts of the program . . . I think all the retirees 
       knew that--potential retirees knew that since they did 
       not pay any monthly insurance premiums as active 
       employees, they were not expected to pay any 
       premiums as retirees. 
 
Sieber acknowledged that he never told employees that 
their plans would or could change. He provided potential 
retirees with booklets, including those listed infra, which he 
called summary plan descriptions ("SPDs") (this is an 
ERISA term of art, referring to the document required by 
ERISA to inform beneficiaries about their rights under a 
plan, see 29 U.S.C. S 1022). These booklets outlined the 
structure of the retirement benefits plans and included no 
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explicit reservation of rights. Sieber testified that he 
thought that the summary plan descriptions for salaried 
employees did not apply to retirees. 
 
Robert Robinson testified that he believed that the 
company always had the right to change or terminate the 
programs in which the retirees were enrolled, but that he 
never told any retirees or potential retirees of that right 
during the relevant time period. He stated that he did not 
inform them of the termination right because the intention 
was to provide coverage for the rest of the beneficiaries' 
lives. 
 
The testifying retirees gave slightly different accounts of 
the content of Sieber's (and others') assurances, but they 
uniformly claimed that they were left with the impression 
that they would have lifelong insurance at the company's 
expense. For example, Stanley Treaster testified that he and 
his wife were told by Sieber that they would get full health 
benefits from the company until he turned 65, and that the 
company would then pay for a supplement so that, along 
with medicare benefits, they would be fully covered. 
Treaster represented that he was never told that he would 
have to pay premiums. Many of the plaintiffs testified that 
they relied on these assurances in making their decision to 
retire. For example, Albert Basom related that he took early 
retirement in 1982 after a "man-to-man meeting with Jerry 
Sieber in his office." He testified that Sieber told him that 
he would have no-cost health coverage for life, for himself 
and his wife. He also said that he "definitely" was 
influenced by the promised health benefits, and that he 
would not have been able to retire without them. 
 
2. Written Communications 
 
As part of the VJEP project, Freedom Forge sent out 
letters in 1982 announcing the plans that stated that early 
retirees would have 
 
       continuation of full Hospitalization, Surgical and Major 
       Medical coverage under the `Program of Hospital and 
       Physicians' Services and Major Medical Expense 
       Benefits' for retirees to age 65. Thereafter, you and 
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       your spouse are covered by the `Program of Hospital 
       and Medical Benefits Supplementing Medicare.' 
 
There was no explicit reference, in either this letter or the 
programs referenced therein, to the fact that the company 
retained the right to amend or cancel the programs. The 
company sent out similar letters in 1991.3 
 
Freedom Forge also issued two distinct kinds of 
documents detailing plan benefits. First, in 1981, 1986, 
and 1993, it distributed a booklet, which conformed with 
the ERISA SPD requirements, entitled "Program of 
Insurance Benefits for Eligible Salaried Employees" to all 
employees and retirees.4 Each booklet included a clear 
disclaimer informing all beneficiaries that Freedom Forge 
retained the right to amend or eliminate the Plan without 
the consent of the beneficiaries.5 These booklets each 
include a section discussing the medical coverage for 
"Pensioners, Employees Receiving Long Term Disability 
Benefits and Surviving Spouses" stating that pensioners 
(and the other named individuals) would be enrolled in the 
"Company Paid Program" or the "Program Supplementing 
Medicare." Additionally, Freedom Forge issued booklets 
describing health benefit programs for retirees and their 
spouses with titles that, according to the retirees, suggested 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. These letters promised continued coverage under the "Program of 
Health Care" and the "Program of Hospital and Medical Benefits 
Supplementing Medicare." It is unclear to what these programs refer, but 
at all events there was no indication in this letter that Freedom Forge 
retained the right to amend or cancel the benefit plans. 
 
4. There was no evidence that any of the plaintiffs either had or had not 
read them. 
 
5. This reservation accords with the actual terms of the Plan. According 
to Article 7 of the Plan, Freedom Forge 
 
       reserves the right at any time and from time to time. . . to amend, 
       suspend, or terminate the Plan or any Component Plan for any 
       reason, in whole or in part, and to adopt any amendment or 
       modification thereto, all without the consent of any Employee or 
       other person. However, the Company shall not have the right to 
       amend or terminate this Plan or any Component Plan or any Benefit 
       with respect to Benefit claims already incurred at the time of 
       amendment, suspension, or termination. 
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they were self-contained programs, and specifically 
intended for pensioners.6 Unlike the other booklets, these 
did not include explicit language reserving the company's 
right to unilaterally amend or eliminate the benefits.7 
 
The plaintiffs assert that they believed that they were not 
"salaried employees" and therefore not controlled by the 
1981, 1986, and 1993 booklets. Each booklet was self-titled 
a "Program of Insurance Benefits for Eligible Salaried 
Employees" (emphasis added). Instead, they relied solely on 
statements of company representatives, the letters 
describing the VJEPS, and those booklets directed at 
retirees for information about their benefit programs. Since 
none of the pensioner-directed booklets prior to 1994 stated 
that Freedom Forge retained the right to amend the Plan, 
and the plaintiffs claim to have been orally assured that 
they would be covered in the same way for life, they 
represent that they thought that the company could not 
unilaterally change or amend their benefits. Plaintiff Ross 
Smith, for example, testified that he understood that the 
special booklets about benefits for pensioners replaced 
those for active salaried employees. When asked whether 
there was a distinction conveyed to him between active and 
pensioned employee benefit programs, he answered,"Oh 
yes. There always was. That's why there are separate 
booklets for the different categories of pensioners." He 
remembered that the benefits administrators "specifically 
went over these things [the benefits] because they were 
kind of unbelievable to us, that they would make this offer." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. These booklets included the: "Program of . . . Benefits, Salaried 
Pensioners & Surviving Spouses Eligible for Medicare" (1988); "Program 
of . . . Benefits, Pensioners and Surviving Spouses--Retired Prior to 
December 31, 1986, Not Eligible for Medicare" (1988); and the 
"Comprehensive Major Medical Plan, Standard Steel Pensioners and 
Surviving Spouses--Retired After December 31, 1986" (1988). 
 
7. Two 1988 programs for "Salaried Pensioners & Surviving Spouses" do 
include provisions about continuation after termination with the caveat, 
"[t]his continuation provision does not apply if Standard Steel - Division 
of Titanium Metals Corporation of America replaces this Program with 
another program. In this event, all benefits will cease on the date this 
Program is terminated." There is no description of how, or under what 
circumstances, a "replacement" or "termination" would take place. 
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In 1994, Freedom Forge published booklets that were 
clearly applicable to retirees that contained the reservation 
of rights language. However, all of the testifying plaintiffs 
(except Snyder) had retired by that time. 
 
C. Testimony Concerning Irreparable Harm 
 
Some of the eleven plaintiffs at the preliminary injunction 
hearing also testified about ways in which they would be 
irreparably harmed absent an injunction. Albert Basom 
 
testified that he takes medication for Paget's disease, a 
bone disease affecting his right leg. He stated that he 
currently pays $5 every three months for prescription drugs 
that would otherwise cost $1072. Basom testified that if he 
chose the no-premium option, he would have to pay more 
than $1000 dollars extra every three months. He testified 
that he would be unable to afford the medication under the 
circumstances and would have to stop taking it. The 
resulting brittleness in his bones could lead to a broken leg, 
confining him to a wheelchair.8 
 
Stanley Treaster testified that he retired early in 1991 as 
part of an incentive package. He said the proposed plan 
"would really kill me, really, that way, because I couldn't 
afford it . . . I'm on nine medications, three inhalers, and 
insulin." He stated that he is on an $804 per month 
pension, and currently pays $5 for three months' 
medication; the new program, he testified, would destroy 
his budget and make it impossible for him to take 
medication, including the insulin he takes twice a day. 
 
Donald Snyder testified that he receives a $1098 per 
month pension. He has had five back operations, electrodes 
in his spine, blood pressure problems, stomach problems, 
and needs extensive medication. He estimated that if the 
new plan were put in place, his medication costs would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. If he took another option, he would have to pay less in prescription 
costs (probably around $1500), but an additional $20 premium every 
month, resulting in a total of about $1740 a year, as opposed to $20 a 
year. Although the mathematical estimates appear inaccurate, the 
District Court apparently credited the underlying claim that his 
prescription would cost $1072 every three months. 
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skyrocket from $5 every three months to $400 a month 
after the first quarter, i.e., for nine months out of the year. 
 
Of the other eight plaintiffs at the preliminary injunction 
hearing, a few testified that they were concerned about 
having to switch some or all of their doctors under the new 
plan. Joe Norman testified that he was very concerned 
about the cost effects of the new program, as well as the 
prospect of switching from an ophthalmologist who had 
treated him since the 1970s. Ronald Beckwith testified that 
his wife would have to switch her gynecologist, urologist, 
and orthopedist. He predicted the cost difference would be 
significant for him, and stated that he was on afixed 
income. Charles Cruikshank, who has a heart condition, 
testified that the new program would affect him because it 
would require him to switch his primary care physician and 
his cardiologist and to drive farther for his bi-annual 
checkup. 
 
Others testified primarily about the financial burden. 
Robert Swartzell testified that he and his wife would have 
to pay significantly more for prescription drugs. Marjorie 
Krebs testified that she was concerned about the effect of 
the higher costs, especially for medication, and that she 
was concerned because there was a history of breast cancer 
in her family. Ross Smith testified that "my wife and I have 
been very fortunate physically, but none of us know what 
tomorrow will bring." He testified that he was on a fixed 
income, and he was worried that the premiums might 
increase, but he did not testify that he would be unable to 
pay them. David Suloff said that he was worried about 
rising premiums and changing Medicare and Social 
Security policies in the future. He noted that he was not on 
a fixed income at the time, but he was sure he would be in 
the future. Joseph Heller testified about the assurances 
given him, but adverted to no threatened harm. 
 
A preliminary injunction was entered for the plaintiffs, 
collectively, on June 30, 1999. Freedom Forge timely 
appealed. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1). 
 
II. Irreparable Harm 
 
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs 
must show both (1) that they are likely to experience 
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irreparable harm without an injunction and (2) that they 
are reasonably likely to succeed on the merits. A court may 
not grant this kind of injunctive relief without satisfying 
these requirements, regardless of what the equities seem to 
require. See AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 
F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994); Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 
40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994); In re Arthur Treacher's 
Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 1982). If 
relevant, the court should also examine the likelihood of 
irreparable harm to the nonmoving party and whether the 
injunction serves the public interest. See AT&T v. Winback, 
42 F.3d at 1427. A preliminary injunction is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Questions of law are reviewed de novo, 
while questions of fact are reviewed for clear error. Frank 
Russell Co. v. Wellington Mgmt. Co., 154 F.3d 97, 101 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
A. General Standards 
 
The irreparable harm requirement is met if a plaintiff 
demonstrates a significant risk that he or she will 
experience harm that cannot adequately be compensated 
after the fact by monetary damages. See Frank's GMC Truck 
Center, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102-03 
(3d Cir. 1988). This is not an easy burden. See, e.g., Morton 
v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1987). In Morton, 
the plaintiff was suing for unlawful discharge, and claimed 
that he would be irreparably harmed unless he were to be 
employed pending suit, because his wages were his sole 
source of income. We acknowledged that Morton was likely 
to succeed on the merits. However, notwithstanding the 
plaintive (and understandable) problems that Morton faced,9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Morton explained the problems of going without a wage: 
 
       Well, I have myself, I have two sons, my older son is in, goes down 
       to the University of Virginia. I have car payment, mortgage, 
       insurance, you know, everything that most people have, in the 
       course of a day. I have charges at Bamberger's and Penney's, 
       different stores. 
 
       I have a loan, two loans, I have one at the Capitol Bank, one with 
       the Chase Manhattan for my son. I guess in the everyday, you 
       know, the everyday expenses that everybody has, food, utilities. 
 
822 F.2d at 371-72. 
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we reversed the district court's injunction order because 
"[a]lthough we are not insensitive to thefinancial distress 
suffered by employees whose wages have been terminated, 
we do not believe that loss of income alone constitutes 
irreparable harm." Id. at 372. The nature of the remedy was 
"purely economic in nature and thus compensable in 
money." Id. Recognizing that the request for money alone 
itself does not foreclose a claim of irreparable injury, see 
id., we concluded that there must be something uniquely 
threatening about the particular loss of money. In Morton, 
we were guided by the Supreme Court's explanation that 
 
       an insufficiency of savings or difficulties in immediately 
       obtaining other employment--external factors common 
       to most discharged employees and not attributable to 
       any unusual actions relating to the discharge itself-- 
       will not support a finding of irreparable injury, however 
       severely they may affect a particular individual. 
 
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 92 n.68 (1974) (emphasis 
added). 
 
B. The District Court's Approach 
 
The District Court was satisfied that the plaintiffs had 
connected the monetary harm to a specific harm that could 
not be remedied after the fact. It noted that "several" of the 
plaintiffs 
 
       testified that their incomes were so limited that the 
       higher copayments and premiums of the proposed 
       plans would require them to forego essential medical 
       care. This testimony established immediate and 
       irreparable harm. . . . Plaintiffs--many of whom live on 
       fixed incomes and would face a Hobson's choice 
       between paying for basic necessities or needed, costly 
       medications--have established that they would suffer 
       like harm if the proposed modifications were to take 
       effect. 
 
We agree that if all the plaintiffs had presented evidence 
that they would have to forego medical care because of the 
heightened costs of the new health plan, each would have 
established irreparable harm. The difficulty with the 
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District Court's conclusion, however, is that only a small 
percentage of the plaintiffs testified, and that even among 
those who did, many did not present any evidence (or even 
make an assertion) that they would have to forego medical 
care or other necessities if the proposed change were to 
take effect. There was thus no basis for inference-drawing. 
Instead of making a case-by-case determination that each 
plaintiff demonstrated irreparable harm, or pointing to 
evidence that strongly indicated that all similarly situated 
Freedom Forge retirees necessarily risk some form of 
irreparable harm, the court dealt with the plaintiffs as a 
unit and concluded that because several of them probably 
risked irreparable harm, that was sufficient to satisfy that 
prong of the preliminary injunction test.10 
 
In making this determination, and in the absence of clear 
Third Circuit precedent, the District Court understandably 
relied on several retiree health insurance cases from other 
courts that have required little or no showing of 
particularized risk of irreparable harm. For example, it cited 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which had"no 
difficulty" finding that a preliminary injunction was 
appropriate in a case similar to this one, in which retirees 
disputed their former employer's power to cease paying 
their insurance premiums. United Steelworkers of America, 
AFL-CIO v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1987). That 
court took note of the "generally believed facts" that: 
 
       (1) most retired union members are not rich, (2) most 
       live on fixed incomes, (3) many will get sick and need 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In a supplemental letter to this court, the plaintiffs objected that 
"Freedom Forge . . . did not raise in the court below the issues of 
whether plaintiffs should be required to produce individualized proof of 
irreparable harm. Nor did it raise the related question of the extent to 
which the testimony given could be generalized to all of the plaintiffs." 
See also United States v. Anthony Dell'Aquilla, Enters. and Subsidiaries, 
150 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, 
an issue not raised in district court will not be heard on appeal."). We 
reach the issue, however, because the burden is clearly on the moving 
party to prove all elements required for a preliminary injunction, see 
Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994), and because 
it is important to clarify the authorities, which may be in disarray, on 
this significant aspect of preliminary injunctions. 
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       medical care, (4) medical care is expensive, (5) medical 
       insurance is, therefore, a necessity, and (6) some 
       retired workers may find it difficult to obtain medical 
       insurance on their own while others can pay for it only 
       out of money that they need for other necessities of life. 
 
Id. The court eschewed invocation of the doctrine of judicial 
notice, which could not by its terms apply, see  Fed. R. 
Evid. 201, and grounded its injunction-affirming holding in 
a single conclusory affidavit of an AFL-CIO president and 
"[c]ommon sense," which "suggests that generally believed 
facts (or something like them) are true." Id. 
 
Other courts have achieved essentially the same result by 
allowing the judge to treat plaintiffs--and the risks 
attending them--in an aggregate way, and to rely on 
generally believed facts not in evidence. In Shalk v. 
Teledyne, Inc., 751 F.Supp. 1261 (W.D. Mich. 1990), aff 'd, 
948 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1991), for example, the court 
granted a preliminary injunction requiring the company to 
pay insurance premiums pending suit in part because"the 
uncertainty posed by the lack of knowing just how much 
money will be needed to cover medical expenses . . . poses 
irreparable harm in the financial planning burden which it 
places on plaintiffs," id. at 1268, and"[i]t is self-evident, to 
the Court at least, that a cost shift to retirees of what 
defendants themselves claim will be approximately $90,000 
per month [total], constitutes irreparable harm," id. at 
1267. This reasoning is congruent with Textron , supra, and 
that of several other courts, as described in the margin.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See, e.g., Golden v. Kelsey Hayes Co., 845 F.Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 
1994) (granting preliminary injunction requiring defendant to continue 
previous insurance plan and citing Textron approvingly where numerous 
retirees, though not retirees from every affected division of a company, 
presented the court with affidavits detailing the hardship they would 
undergo without a preliminary injunction), aff 'd, 73 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 
1996); Mowbray v. Kozlowski, 725 F.Supp. 888 (W.D. Va. 1989) ("The 
class includes approximately some 9,000 members. If a stay is granted, 
some number of these will be faced with the difficult decision of either 
forgoing needed medical attention, forgoing other expenditures, or 
disposing of enough of their property to come within the guidelines as to 
assistance, which guidelines are the very substance of this action. 
Failure to obtain needed medical care could result in the death of some 
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While these cases have a certain intuitive appeal, they do 
not withstand rigorous scrutiny. The law does not take 
judicial notice of matters of "common sense," and common 
sense is no substitute for evidence. A preliminary 
injunction may not be based on facts not presented at a 
hearing, or not presented through affidavits, deposition 
testimony, or other documents, about the particular 
situations of the moving parties. The elasticity that the 
opposite conclusion would permit would essentially shift 
the burden to the defendant to disprove widely believed 
facts and would turn the preliminary injunction balancing 
process on its head. 
 
In lieu of (or in addition to) "common sense," many of 
these cases pursue an additional approach, resting a 
preliminary injunction for many on the testimony of a few. 
This is not inappropriate so long as the plaintiffs lay an 
adequate foundation from which one could draw inferences 
that the testifying plaintiffs are similarly situated--in terms 
of irreparable harm--to all the other plaintiffs. When a 
court, such as the District Court, concludes that there is 
clear evidence that most, but not all, individuals will be 
harmed, it treats each individual only as part of an 
aggregate; in contrast, when a court infers a risk of harm 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
class members. Surely this is substantial, if not irreparable harm." 
(emphasis added); Shultz v. Teledyne, Inc., 657 F.Supp. 289, 293 (W.D. 
Pa. 1987) ("We have had testimony in this case indicating that retirees 
on fixed incomes will suffer financial hardship and in some cases will be 
unable to pay for individual health insurance coverage. Some individuals 
indicated that they would forego medical care for themselves and their 
families due to their inability to pay for either the insurance coverage 
or 
 
the direct cost of medical care. We believe that plaintiffs in this case 
have established that they will suffer a risk of irreparable harm.") 
(emphasis added); Mamula v. Satrolloy, 578 F.Supp. 563, 577 (S.D. Ohio 
1983) ("The adequacy of a monetary award to a person unable to afford 
health insurance coverage rests on the assumption that the person will 
seek and obtain necessary medical care, will pay for the medical care 
received at that time, and will simply be recompensed later by the 
defendant when a judgment is rendered against it. Such an assumption 
could have some validity if the costs of medical services and 
hospitalization in today's society were well within the financial reach of 
the average worker."). 
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to all individuals although only a few testify, it is reasoning 
inductively. The former mode of analysis is unacceptable; 
the latter is the daily work of fact-finders. In short, in the 
absence of a foundation from which one could infer that all 
(or virtually all) members of a group are irreparably 
harmed, we do not believe that a court can enter a mass 
preliminary injunction. 
 
An important factor animating our holding is our respect 
for the extraordinary nature of the preliminary injunction 
power. We have repeatedly insisted that the use of judicial 
power to arrange relationships prior to a full determination 
on the merits is a weighty matter, and the preliminary 
injunction device should not be exercised unless the 
moving party shows that it specifically and personally risks 
irreparable harm. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra 
Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992); Frank's GMC Truck 
Center, 847 F.2d at 102-03. The Supreme Court, moreover, 
has instructed that the tool of the preliminary injunction 
should be reserved for "extraordinary" situations. Sampson, 
415 U.S. at 88, 92. And as we have previously stated, "[t]he 
dramatic and drastic power of injunctive force may be 
unleashed only against conditions generating a presently 
existing actual threat." Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B & 
B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).12 
 
In this vein, we have also insisted that the risk of 
irreparable harm must not be speculative. See, e.g., Acierno 
v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645 (3d Cir. 1994). 13 For many 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See also, e.g., Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Labs., Inc., 376 F.2d 
543, 547 (3d Cir. 1967) ("[T]he black letter rule" is that "an injunction 
is 
an extraordinary remedy to be granted pendente lite only upon a 
showing of the likelihood of irreparable harm before the case is resolved 
on the merits."); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Gittone, 110 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 
1940) ("We have pointed out frequently that the granting of a preliminary 
injunction is an exercise of a very far-reaching power, never to be 
indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it."). 
 
13. Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797 (3d 
Cir. 
1989) (district court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary 
injunction when there was no hard evidence that could have led the 
court to believe that a broken contract would force one party to go out 
of business); Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121 (3d Cir. 1987) (district 
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if not most of the plaintiffs in this case, the risk of 
irreparable harm seems speculative given the evidence 
presented to the District Court. The plaintiffs rely on the 
common sense approach of Textron to reason that most of 
these retirees probably cannot afford the premiums. This 
speculation cannot support an injunction--especially given 
the evidence of the relatively low premiums in the proposed 
plans. 
 
Moreover, the plaintiffs all but concede that not all of 
them are threatened with irreparable harm. At the hearing, 
for example, counsel for the plaintiffs stated that"most," 
not all, of the plaintiffs retired under early retirement plans. 
He stated that Sieber met with "most" plaintiffs to discuss 
"most" claim programs and that "most of these people are 
on fixed income." The assertions of counsel were borne out 
by the testimony; some, but not all, plaintiffs testified that 
they were on fixed incomes. A few, but not most, testified 
that they would be forced to forego medical care. The 
District Court itself used qualified language in its decision 
("many" of the plaintiffs live onfixed incomes; "several" of 
the testifying plaintiffs stated that their incomes were 
limited) (emphasis added). 
 
Based on this record, we conclude there was insufficient 
evidence from which the District Court could infer that all 
the plaintiff-retirees and their spouses (in whose favor the 
injunction ran) were in such financial straits that they 
would be forced to choose between medical care and other 
necessities. In order to obtain a preliminary injunction that 
would apply to each one of them, the plaintiffs would have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
court erred in finding irreparable harm when there was weakly alleged 
possibility that, in claim of retaliatory discharge, being kept out of the 
workplace threatened to discourage coworkers from testifying; such a 
charge could constitute irreparable harm, but more specific facts 
indicating the existence of such a threat needed to be presented); United 
States v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 533 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1976) (threatened 
effect on ability to provide medical care too attenuated to constitute 
irreparable harm); A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 440 
F.2d 
 
761 (3d Cir. 1971) (threatened loss of "theatre momentum" not 
sufficiently concrete to require Columbia Pictures to deliver promised 
film before adjudication of meaning of contract). 
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had to present affidavits or other evidence from which one 
could at least infer that each of them was so threatened. 
Instead, the plaintiffs only presented evidence from which a 
court could infer that some of them were threatened with 
harm. In holding that this is insufficient to support a 
preliminary injunction, we recognize that such orders are 
sought when an emergency threatens, and that the moving 
party may not be able to marshal extensive evidence. That 
does not mean, however, that proof by association in a law 
suit, or proof by "common sense," will suffice.14 
 
The plaintiffs have identified one case in which we appear 
to have granted a preliminary injunction for a large group 
of plaintiffs without requiring evidence that the parties were 
similarly threatened, but we are not persuaded by the 
citation. In United Steelworkers of America v. Fort Pitt Steel 
Casting, 598 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1979), we upheld a 
preliminary injunction that required an employer to pay 
insurance premiums during a strike. We stated: 
 
       If the risk of "water pipes freezing" can constitute 
       irreparable injury, See Celotex Corp. v. Oil Workers, 
       516 F.2d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1975), then surely the 
       possibility that a worker would be denied adequate 
       medical care as a result of having no insurance would 
       constitute "substantial and irreparable injury." Id. 
       Moreover, the risk of irreparable injury was not 
       appreciably lessened merely because the employees 
       allegedly would remain covered for 30 days after 
       premium payments were terminated and because the 
       employees thereafter would have the option to convert 
       to individual policies. There was no assurance at the 
       time the injunction was issued that the strike would 
       end within 30 days; thus there was a significant risk 
       that absent an injunction, the employees would be 
       without insurance coverage. In addition, the likelihood 
       that all of the employees could have exercised their 
       right to obtain individual policies was problematic, 
       because while the employees were on strike, they were 
       not collecting their wages. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In situations where the proof would be redundant and waste 
everyone's resources, the nonmoving party could, of course, choose to 
stipulate to irreparable harm. 
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Id. at 1280. 
 
Although we appeared to treat the plaintiffs as a 
collective, it seems that in that case--where the employees 
risked losing not only all their insurance but also their jobs 
--the court had sufficient evidence from which to infer that 
such loss constituted a risk of irreparable harm for all, or 
practically all, the employees. In contrast, we know the 
evidence upon which the District Court relied here, and we 
find it wanting. At all events, the Fort Pitt  panel did not 
confront the issue we discuss today. 
 
We do not think that the precept that multiple plaintiffs 
must adduce evidence from which it might be inferred that 
each of them is threatened with harm will be a serious 
hurdle to plaintiffs. Simple affidavits should typically 
suffice. Moreover, in many instances, the defendant will be 
incapable of severing its conduct towards one plaintiff from 
that towards another. In an injunction forbidding a town to 
build a wall, for example, the wall applies equally to all who 
are harmed by it, and only one plaintiff need demonstrate 
likelihood of success and irreparable harm in order to 
forestall construction. Likewise, if numerous riparian 
landowners bring suit asking for an injunction against a 
company dumping toxic substances into a lake, it does not 
matter that only one or two plaintiffs can show irreparable 
harm, for the court cannot possibly divine which toxics 
invaded which plaintiff 's waterfront. As Heraclitus noted in 
ancient days, one "could not step twice into the same 
rivers; for other waters are ever flowing on to you." Quoted 
in J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 62:14 (Justin Kaplan 
ed., 16th ed. 1992). In the case at bar, in contrast, Freedom 
Forge's counsel stated at oral argument that the company 
may continue the old plan for some pensioners while 
shifting the others to the proposed plan.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. It goes without saying that we lay out only a general framework, fully 
aware that there may be unanticipated circumstances in which a 
particular (direct or inferential) demonstration of harm by each plaintiff 
will be unworkable. 
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C. Switching Doctors as Irreparable Harm 
 
Plaintiffs urge a separate basis for finding irreparable 
harm. They point to the testimony of several plaintiffs who 
stated that they would have to switch health care providers, 
which they view, at least potentially, as an emotionally and 
medically risky move. They argue that this harmflows from 
the alleged fiduciary breach, and that a preliminary 
injunction is necessary to prevent it. Although they do not 
aver that any company executive ever promised anyone that 
they would never have to switch doctors, the plaintiffs 
contend that such a promise inhered in the general 
assurance that the overarching health plan structure would 
not change. 
 
There are two problems with this argument. First, the 
gravamen of the complaint is that the plaintiffs were 
promised that their insurance would be maintained, not 
that they would never have to switch physicians. Their 
harm is therefore insufficiently related to the complaint and 
does not deserve the benefits of protective measures that a 
preliminary injunction affords. Cf. John Leubsdorf, The 
Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 
541 (1978) ("Not even all irreparable harm, but only 
irreparable harm to legal rights, should count."). 
 
Second, the hassle of switching doctors, although 
emotionally draining, is not the kind of "irreparable harm" 
contemplated by the preliminary injunction standard. In 
the rapidly changing world of health care, numerous plans 
have switched to managed care, requiring employees and 
other plan beneficiaries to change doctors. We are not 
prepared to hold, in the absence of a highly particularized 
and compelling demonstration of hardship, that irreparable 
harm flows from such a plan change simpliciter . There are 
many rearrangements--not just scrimping and saving 
rearrangements--that individuals involved in a legal battle 
must endure pending the conclusion of a suit, and very few 
will be without some anguish. As we have stated, 
"injunctions will not be issued merely to allay the fears and 
apprehensions or to soothe the anxieties of the parties." 
Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 92 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (quoting Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco 
Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
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Because the plaintiffs have presented no evidence that 
the doctors available to them under the new plan are in any 
way inadequate, or that the mere transfer from one 
physician to another is medically risky for any individual 
plaintiff, we will not hold that a preliminary injunction is 
appropriate based on the change-of-physician argument. 
Moreover, if we were to recognize this argument for some 
plaintiffs, a fortiori this approach could not be generalized 
to all the plaintiffs. 
 
D. Class Certification Issues 
 
The plaintiffs further contend that since they have sought 
class certification, see supra note 1, they should be treated 
as a class pending the court's determination on that issue. 
Some courts have uncritically treated a group as a 
collective when a would-be class has petitioned for 
certification. See, e.g., Hinckley v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 866 
F.Supp. 1034 (E.D. Mich. 1994). In Hinckley, the court 
found irreparable harm to the 500 plaintiffs when only one 
of the two named plaintiffs in the proposed class presented 
evidence of threatened harm, and none demonstrated that 
money would not be an effective compensation. See id. at 
1044-45. The court based its order, in part, on the fact that 
it was dealing with a potential class. "[T]he court will take 
into consideration the irreparable harm faced by putative 
class members before class certification because of the 
nature of injunctive relief at this stage of the litigation." Id. 
Likewise, in Lapeer Cty. Medical Care Facility v. Michigan, 
765 F.Supp. 1291, 1301 (W.D. Mich. 1991), the court 
treated a group of noncertified plaintiffs as a class. The 
court analogized the preliminary injunction order to 
dismissal orders and compromise negotiations, in which a 
court can treat a non-certified potential class as a unit. Cf. 
Musto v. American General Corp., 615 F.Supp. 1483, 1504- 
05 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 861 F.2d 897 
(6th Cir. 1988) (treating certified class collectively for 
irreparable harm determination). 
 
We disagree. We see no reason why the pendency of a 
class action certification petition should alter our analysis. 
We have no basis on which to judge the viability of the 
class certification request, which we understand to be 
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contested. Merely petitioning for class certification cannot 
provide plaintiffs the right to be treated collectively. 
Furthermore, a class action determination focuses on 
similarities between the legal claims of the parties, see 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), while a preliminary injunction 
determination, by requiring a showing of irreparable harm, 
depends in many cases (including this one) on 
circumstances entirely independent of legal rights: the 
particular resources available to each member of the class 
to weather hardships pending a trial. 
 
E. Irreparable Harm - Conclusion 
 
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is necessary that 
we vacate the preliminary injunction as to all of the 
nontestifying plaintiffs. There is simply insufficient evidence 
of irreparable harm as to those plaintiffs. This conclusion 
does not mean, however, that we must uphold the 
preliminary injunction for all the testifying plaintiffs. 
Rather, only three of the testifying plaintiffs met the high 
preliminary injunction standard. Basom and Treaster 
effectively demonstrated that they would not be able to 
afford the medicine they need if the new plan is put into 
effect pending trial. Snyder is a close case, but we will defer 
to the District Court's discretion in this matter, and its 
decision that he risked irreparable harm. Therefore if 
Basom, Treaster, and Snyder meet the "likelihood of 
success on the merits" requirement, we will uphold the 
preliminary injunction as applied to them.16 However, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. In opposition to the grant of a preliminary injunction for any 
plaintiff, 
Freedom Forge submits that the new plans do a better job, overall, of 
assuring good health care to the plaintiffs. Whether or not this is true, 
on this record we cannot determine which is the better plan for the 
plaintiffs. We are also wary of accepting the company's (or the 
plaintiffs') 
vision of which is the better overall plan at the preliminary injunction 
stage, especially when the parties are struggling over particular, not 
general, aspects. See Shalk v. Teledyne, Inc. , 751 F.Supp. 1261, 1267 
(W.D. Mich. 1990) ("[D]efendants claim that the current Teledyne Plus 
Plan offers coverage which is `substantial and in many respects better 
than the prior plan. . . .' This argument is of no consequence. It is not 
this Court's task to decide which health plan is`better.' ") (emphasis in 
original). 
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several of the testifying plaintiffs (Swartzell, Krebs, Norman, 
Heller, Cruikshank) did not testify to any particular facts 
that would make the switching of plans cause them 
irreparable harm. None stated that he or she was on a fixed 
income, or that he or she would be unable to pay. At all 
events, there was insufficient evidence that any of these 
plaintiffs was threatened with a financial burden that 
would force them to eschew medical treatment or other 
necessities such as food or shelter. Therefore, we will vacate 
the preliminary injunction as applied to them. 
 
Our most difficult decisions concern those plaintiffs who 
testified to serious financial burdens, but did not represent 
that they would have to forego medical treatment. Smith 
and Beckwith testified that they were on fixed incomes; 
Suloff said that he would be on a fixed income in the 
future. But given the relatively low level of the additional 
payments under the proposed plans, we can not conclude 
that the testimony of a plaintiff that he or she is on a fixed 
income is sufficient evidence from which a court can infer 
irreparable harm. As we discussed supra, there must be 
some specific harm identified that flows from the actual 
financial burden in a given case. Therefore, we must also 
vacate the order of the District Court as to these plaintiffs 
for failure to demonstrate irreparable harm. 
 
III. Probability of Success on the Merits 
 
The balance of this opinion applies only to those 
remaining three plaintiffs--Basom, Treaster, and Snyder-- 
who provided sufficient evidence of irreparable harm. As to 
them, we must determine whether the District Court 
abused its discretion in concluding that they were 
reasonably likely to succeed on the merits. 
 
ERISA provides that "a fiduciary shall discharge his 
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C.S 1104(a)(1). The 
fiduciary may not, in the performance of these duties, 
"materially mislead those to whom the duties of loyalty and 
prudence are owed." In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. 
Benefits "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1261 (3d Cir. 1995). 
See also Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 33 F.3d 
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226, 238 (3d Cir. 1994); Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters 
Health and Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 
1994); Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 
1993). A plan administrator, like Sieber and other Freedom 
Forge administrators, acts as a fiduciary when explaining 
plan benefits and business decisions about plan benefits to 
its employees. See Unysis, 57 F.3d at 1261 n.10.17 
 
An employee may recover for a breach of fiduciary duty 
if he or she proves that an employer, acting as afiduciary, 
made a material misrepresentation that would confuse a 
reasonable beneficiary about his or benefits, and the 
beneficiary acted thereupon to his or her detriment. See id. 
at 1264. Having made such representations, a company 
cannot insulate itself from liability by including unequivocal 
statements retaining the right to terminate plans at any 
time in the SPDs. See id. Moreover, a fiduciary may not 
remain silent when he or she knows that a reasonable 
beneficiary could rely on the silence to his or her detriment. 
See Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300 ("Th[e] duty to inform . . . 
entails not only a negative duty not to misinform, but also 
an affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows that 
silence might be harmful."). 
 
The facts of this case, described supra, are so much like 
those in Unisys, the landmark case in this area, that we 
need spend but little time addressing this prong of the 
preliminary injunction standard. In Unisys, as here, the 
company announced a significant change in its benefit plan 
scheme, after which beneficiaries were to shoulder the 
responsibility of paying premiums that had previously been 
the exclusive responsibility of the company. The Unisys 
plaintiffs objected, noting that their SPD included the 
statement that: "Coverage continues for you for life and for 
your dependents while they remain eligible provided you 
don't stop the contributions for their coverage." 57 F.3d at 
1259 (emphasis in original). They also adduced evidence, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. A fiduciary includes any person who "exercises any discretionary 
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan" 
and any person who "has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of such plan." 29 U.S.C. 
S 1002(21)(A). 
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here, that they had been informally promised "lifetime" 
benefits without any reference to a reservations of rights. 
See id. 
 
Unisys acknowledged the statements regarding lifetime 
coverage in the SPDs, but defended on the grounds that 
elsewhere in the SPDs it explicitly retained the right to 
amend or change the plans at any time. Relying on the 
principle that "when a plan administrator explains plan 
benefits to its employees, it acts in a fiduciary capacity," id. 
at 1261, we concluded that the conflicting statements could 
give rise to an action under ERISA because ERISA plan 
administrators have an independent fiduciary obligation 
"not to misinform employees through material 
misrepresentations and incomplete, inconsistent, or 
contradictory disclosures." Id. at 1264. We concluded that 
a misrepresentation is material if "there is a substantial 
likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee in 
making an adequately informed retirement decision." Id. 
 
A. Unisys and Plaintiffs Basom and Tre aster 
 
In this case, as in Unisys, the plaintiffs do not deny that 
there is an explicit reservation of the right to terminate or 
amend at any time within the booklets for active employees. 
They contend, however, that they reasonably believed that 
the active employees' booklets did not apply to them. In 
support of this contention, the plaintiffs presented evidence 
that Freedom Forge distributed separate booklets 
summarizing the benefits of pensioners and surviving 
spouses that included no explicit reservation of the power 
to amend or change the programs.18 Freedom Forge 
responds that the lack of reservation clauses in the 
booklets is immaterial because the booklets were not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Although some of those booklets did contain a reference to the 
possible termination of the programs by Freedom Forge, these references 
did not describe a process for unilateral program termination that would 
alert a potential retiree to the instability of his or her benefits: "This 
continuation provision does not apply if Standard Steel - Division of 
Titanium Metals Corporation of America replaces this Program with 
another program. In this event, all benefits will cease on the date this 
Program is terminated." See supra note 7. 
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actually summary plan descriptions. Although we agree 
that the form and title of a document may be considered 
when determining whether a beneficiary could reasonably 
rely on the statements therein, conflicting assertions cannot 
be ignored because they are not in the formal ERISA 
document. Unisys did not rely on the official nature of the 
SPDs to conclude that the company had breached its duty, 
and based its decision in part on the informal 
communications of Unisys management. See id. at 1261- 
65. 
 
Freedom Forge further contends that the booklets 
directed at "Eligible Salaried Employees," which included 
explicit reservations of rights, applied to both those who 
were active employees and those who were on pensions. It 
notes the absence, in the "informal" booklets introduced 
into evidence by the plaintiffs, of ERISA-required details, 
such as the name of the plan administrator and the means 
of complaint, the lack of which makes them something less 
than SPDs. The question before us, however, is not what 
the booklets actually were, but what they would appear to 
be to a reasonable employee. The "informal" booklets that 
the plaintiffs introduced into the record are titled 
"Programs," suggesting a parallel status with the "formal" 
booklets, also entitled "Programs." Furthermore, the 
plaintiffs presented testimony of several retirees who stated 
they were told and believed that the "Salaried Employees" 
booklets did not apply to them. Gerald Sieber, whose 
responsibility it had been to explain retirement benefits, 
testified that he thought that the retiree booklets, and not 
the "Salaried Employees" booklets, defined the rights of the 
retirees. Finally, the plaintiffs note that the"Salaried 
Employees" booklets include descriptions of several benefits 
(such as dental) that do not apply to pensioners, suggesting 
that they were not relevant to retirees. 
 
In response to these arguments, Freedom Forge 
acknowledges that were it to eliminate benefits altogether, 
that might make the misrepresentations actionable. It 
submits, however, that since it only intends to amend the 
Plan and shift the costs, there was no actual 
misrepresentation when its representatives promised 
"health benefits . . . for life." Freedom Forge also 
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emphasizes that health care itself has never been"free" in 
that beneficiaries have always had to pay copayments and 
deductibles. However, some of the testimony at the hearing 
indicated that the Freedom Forge employees' understanding 
of the promise of life-long health insurance was that they 
would never have to pay premiums. The District Court 
found this testimony credible, and it is supported by the 
record; hence, we do not disturb its conclusion. Given the 
substantial rearrangement of the rights and duties 
regarding health insurance proposed by Freedom Forge, we 
are convinced that there was sufficient evidence that the 
proposed changes, if effected, would countermand the 
promises of health care for life. 
 
Finally, Freedom Forge suggests that it should not be 
liable because it did not anticipate that it would change the 
plans, so that the misleading statements were made 
without the requisite scienter. We encountered, and 
rejected, a like defense in Unisys. See  57 F.3d at 1265 
n.15. There, we recognized that the company had no reason 
to expect, at the time it distributed the misleading SPDs, 
that the plans would be modified. However, because Unisys 
was aware that it retained the right to modify, a knowing 
failure to clarify the material information about the 
retention of power was a breach of its fiduciary duty. We 
indicated that in order for a company to avoid liability on 
the grounds that it did not expect to change or eliminate a 
plan, the change or elimination would have to be, at least, 
"completely unanticipated." Id. As in Unisys, Freedom Forge 
had sufficient awareness of the power to change the Plan. 
See id. ("[T]he company had the foresight to draft and 
incorporate reservation of rights clauses into its retiree 
medical plans, which expressly gave the company the right 
to terminate the plans if they became onerous."). 
 
Based on Unisys, we conclude that the plaintiffs 
presented sufficient evidence of statements that would 
cause "a substantial likelihood" of "misleading a reasonable 
employee in making an adequately informed retirement 
decision" and hence that Basom and Treaster are 
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reasonably likely to succeed on the merits of their breach 
claim. See id.19 
 
B. Unisys and Plaintiff Snyder 
 
Unlike the other two remaining plaintiffs, the case of 
Donald Snyder is not controlled by Unisys because 
although he went on disability in 1983, he did not retire 
until 1999, more than four years after Freedom Forge 
began publishing booklets for retirees that included a 
strong reservation of rights. Snyder averred that in 1983 he 
was told that he and his wife would be taken care of for the 
rest of their lives. Unlike the other plaintiffs, who retired 
early, he produced no evidence of detrimental reliance on 
these misrepresentations. He presumably went on disability 
involuntarily and there is no evidence that he retired early. 
Since the lawyers for both sides were dealing with the 
plaintiffs collectively, the peculiar nature of his claim was 
not briefed. Although we do not foreclose the possibility 
that Snyder could adduce facts to state a claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty under ERISA, the facts before the District 
Court after the preliminary injunction hearing do not 
suffice to support a conclusion that he is reasonably likely 
to succeed on the merits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Freedom Forge has asserted that, regardless of the strength of 
plaintiffs' Unisys argument, they are barred from pursuing any claim by 
ERISA's statute of limitations. This is a matter of considerable 
difficulty 
 
and implicates sophisticated questions about whether the statute begins 
to run at the date of the misrepresentations, the date of the plan 
amendment, or some other date, as well as the issues left unresolved in 
Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544 (3d Cir. 1996), about the 
anatomy and scope of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, see id. at 
1552 n.5. The District Court concluded that the claims were not likely 
to be barred by the statute. However, Freedom Forge's counsel conceded 
at oral argument that the statute of limitation defense was not before the 
court of appeals "as a substantive statute of limitations argument." As 
he noted, "[t]his court will have opportunity in the next Unisys 
litigation 
 
to rule on whether or not that statute of limitations [argument] is 
substantively correct." Therefore, we do not reach these statute of 
limitations questions at this time. 
 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's order as to Basom and Treaster, but will vacate the 
preliminary injunction as it applies to all others. 
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